Vol. 5, no. 2: Full Issue by Association Record, Denver Bar
Denver Law Review 
Volume 5 Issue 2 Article 9 
1928 
Vol. 5, no. 2: Full Issue 
Denver Bar Association Record 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
5 Denv. B. Ass'n Rec. (1928). 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
RECORD
PUBLISHED MONTHLY
VOL. V DENVER, FEBRUARY, 1928 No. 2
Annual Banquet
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The annual banquet of this Association
will be held Wednesday evening, February
22, 1928, at the University Club, at 7 P. M.
The Hon. Silas H. Strawn, President of
the American Bar Association, will speak.
Dress will be formal.
The price of tickets and other details will
be given in a later notice.
The Committee is making L, special effort
to have an entertaining program with special
amusement features, and a large attendance is
desired.
Mr. Gould, Secretary of this Association,
will have charge of the distribution of the
tickets. The office buildings will be can-
vassed, and the services of about twenty
younger members of the Association are de-
sired in this connection. Anyone willing to
assist in the sale of these tickets is requested
to communicate with Mr. Gould, 517 Symes
Bldg., Main 5715.
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January Meeting
HE regular meeting was called
to order by President Stearns
on January 12th, 1928, in the
Chamber of Commerce Building, at
12:45 P.M.
Mr. Clyde Barker, Chairman of the
Special Committee appointed for con-
sideration of feasibility of publication
of digests of the Colorado Supreme
Court, reporting for the Committee,
stated that two plans for the publica-
tion of these Digests had been con-
sidered. The first, to have the Clerk
of the Supreme Court publish these
digests at regular intervals; the sec-
ond, to have a Committee of the Bar
Association take care of these digests
each month as a part of the Bar As-
sociation Record. Mr. Barker highly
recommended the second plan in that
it would cost the members of the Bar
nothing for this service and would also
make the Record a far more valuable
publication.
Mr. Edward Knowles, Chairman of
the Annual Banquet Committee, re-
ported the annual banquet would be
held at the University Club on Febru-
ary 22nd, the speaker of the evening
being the Hon. Silas H. Strawn, Pres-
ident of the American Bar Association.
Mr. Knowles further stated that there
would be other entertainment at the
banquet and not more than one other
speaker.
President Stearns before calling on
Mr. Cherrington stated that he at least
had always considered the subject of
political science as a shifting proposi-
tion and was reminded, in considering
this subject, of a statement made
quite recently by a friend of his; that
"he did not know whether we were at
the present time learning more and
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more about less and less or less and
less about more and more". He then
introduced Mr. Ben Cherrington, Ex-
ecutive Secretary of the Foundation
for the Advancement of the Social
Sciences of the University of Denver,
under whose auspices the speaker, Dr.
James T. Shotwell, was present.
Mr. Cherrington stated that the
name "Dr. James T. Shotwell, Profes-
sor of History", appears in the Colum-
bia University catalogue, and describ-
ed Dr. Shotwell as more or less of a
war casualty, he having been taken
to Paris by President Wilson at the
time the Treaty of Versailles was
drawn up and having lived in Europe
practically continuously since the war
writing a history of the war which is
unique in that it attempts to present
the effect war has upon the people of
the countries involved, their govern-
ments and their living conditions. A
committee of 200 European statesmen
with offices in every European country
save Spain are helping Dr. Shotwell
in this work, and 100 volumes have
been written at the present time, while
100 more volumes are being prepared,
and the end is not yet in sight. Stat-
ing that no one could speak with morE
authority upon European aftairs than
the day's speaker, he introduced Dr.
Shotwell.
Prefacing his speech with the remark
that he came before the meeting as
a historian and not as a partisan, and
wanted to briefly analyze the history
of the League of Nations from a his-
torical standpoint, Dr. Shotwell stated
that in the controversies in this coun-
try about the League of Nations and
the World Court, we have passed from
partisanship to legalistic arguments
and that he for one deplored the sit-
uation which exists in America where
the people of a country as a whole
are trying to pass amateur legal opin-
ions on technical questions, such as
are involved in a discussion of the
League of Nations, when they should
be discussing first, what the League of
Nations has been up to, and second,
its construction.
The structure of the League as it is
working in practice at the present
time is far different from the original
plans for the League which provided
for the Assembly, the Council and the
Secretariat, which were to be of im
portance in the order named, but now
that the League was actually in oper-
ation, the order of importance of the
different branches was just reversed.
Taking up the Secretariat, Dr- Shot-
well pointed out that originally it was
planned to have this Department func-
tion all of the time, but it was to be
as unimportant as possible in order
to keep away from international bu-
reaucracy. At the present time, under
enlightened guidance, they have gath-
ered together experts of the highest
calibre in all types of public service
to work in Geneva, and to coordinate
the efforts of a growing world com-
munity. A peculiar situation with re-
gard to these experts is that most of
them have higher reputations in other
countries than they have in their own,
this being the chief source of weak-
ness in the Secretariat, in that the
members are thought not to pay as
much attention to their own country's
welfare as their fellow-countrymen
think they should. This grouping to-
gether of experts has however had
one very beneficial result, in that the
smaller states have for the first time
in their history the highest degree of
technical skill available at their dis-
posal. Reciting as an example the
Danube Valley situation, over which
Austria and Hungary could never for-
merly agree: In former days it was
the usual state of affairs that once
freight cars went across this bound-
ary, they were never returned, mak-
ing it necessary for the shipper at the
boundary line to unload from the cars
of one country and reload his goods
upon the cars of the other country;
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this and other controversies have been
amicably settled by the technical ex-
perts of the Secretariat who lacked
any prejudices. Now, owing to the
work of the Secretariat, there is a
sense of respect for its work, that
might be termed "the decencies of in-
ternational intercourse". The Secre-
tariat performs most of the technical
work of the League and rarely deals
with political questions and then, only
under specific directions from the
council, which is chiefly concerned
with this phase of the work.
Taking up this branch of the League,
Dr. Shotwell pointed out that in the
League Covenant it was not intended
that the Council was to meet oftener
than once each year, but ever since its
inception it has met at least four times
each year and at the present time the
smaller nations are protesting against
this number of meetings of the Coun-
cil and desire instead that these gath-
erings be held more often because
these smaller states fear the secret
diplomacy of the larger powers. The
Council has developed into meetings
of the Foreign Ministers, who are re-
sponsible for the foreign policy of
their nations. Dr. Shotwell stated
that in his opinion the meetings of the
Council are a great gain over prewar
diplomacy. Formerly, the nations
wrote notes to each other and the
different foreign Ministers would be
corresponding with other Ministers
whom they had never even seen. These
notes often went unanswered for long
periods of time, but now the foreign
ministers meet together and there is
no formal note writing from one to
the other, with the result that there
is no accumulation of public senti-
ment, extorted by the newspapers in
their respective nations, while they
are awaiting a reply from some other
country. The Council brings the note
writers together in meetings and they
now have confidence in each other.
They call each other "Colleague", and
Britain, Germany and France have re-
tained their Foreign Ministers, no
matter what political faction happen-
ed to be in power at home. This is
due, not primarily to the fact that the
people at home have confidence in
their respective foreign ministers, but
because the other countries do, and
while the representatives of the larger
powers have conferences, the smaller
ones are present and listen in on these
meetings.
In Dr. Shotwell's opinion, the Coun-
cil is the best place to settle political
disputes, as the Council is not a court
where a judgment can le rendered
and hence a compromise is reached
more easily in the Council than in the
world court, as people speak more
freely when a judgment cannot be
rendered, and they are under no com-
pulsion to reach any definite conclu-
sion. Dr. Shotwell brought out that
any dispute was a political question
up to the point where a compromise
is reached or a definite issue is to be
settled, then it becomes a juridical
question for determination in a court
of law such as The World Court pro-
vided for in the League; and he fur-
ther stated that these disputes did not
usually go to the World Court for a
final trial and judgment.
As an example of the political ques-
tions settled by the Council, he cited
the "Saare Valley question". Over
this territory, which lies on the border
of Alsace-Lorraine, France has been
given a mandate of fifteen years to
exploit the coal mines in this region.
in return for the coal property lost
during the war. It seems that France
had cut their military force in this
area from 800 to 300 soldiers. At the
next meeting of the Council the Ger-
man Minister was to preside for the
first time and because of this the
German papers were demanding that
France cut their military force still
further because it would be a showing
of bad faith if this were not done. At
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the same time, the French papers in
commenting on the situation, were
quite strong in stating that France
should not be intimidated by what
they called a "German bluff". This
was a political question and after a
long discussion, it was finally settled
in the Council by the Italian repre-
sentative, who said he thought France
could have 800 soldiers in the region
if they did not use them. This hu-
morous remark concluded a very ser-
ious controversy to the apparent sat-
isfaction of all concerned.
The Assembly is the Parliament of
the Nations, and it never gets beyond
the preparation and discussion of
world affairs. Its matters of import-
ance are usually referred to a com-
mission.
The commissions of the League are
summoned to meet from time to time
to deal with specific problems and Dr.
Shotwell said at this point that there
was not a week in the year during
which some commission was not hold-
ing a meeting, discussing some na-
tional problem, something unheard of
before the war.
In conclusion, Dr. Shotwell said that
as first planned, the League was only
for the purpose of averting wars, but
that due to the way the League had
functioned, it was going to succeed
because of.the world interest in build-
ing up human contacts and a world
community.
B&M.
Martial Law in Colorado
(Address delivered before The Law Club, Jan. 25, 1928,
By Frazer Arnold, of the Denver Bar.)
RGANIZATIONS or societies to
oppose organized government
have existed continuously from
the Middle Ages to the present day.
The first anarchist is said to have
been Zeno the Stoic. He represented
a group of philosophers opposed to
the ideas of the State as elaborated by
Plato.
In 19th and 20th Century despot-
isms, organizations to oppose govern-
ment generally, have claimed a large
share of the talent and energy of the
revolutionary movement, especially
among the youth. The cruelties and
stupidities of their government excited
fiery indignation against the only
State with which they were familiar.
It has been characteristic of the Rus-
sian and German temperament, es-
pecially, that it will work out compre-
hensive systems of philosophy to har-
monize all society and all life with
some rather narrow conclusion. This
is done with a laboriousness and a
plausibility that are amazing. With
the criminality of their own govern-
ment immutably fixed in mind, they
evolve systems which demonstrate
that the governments of France, the
United States and all other modern
republics are practically as bad as any
other form of the State. They very
early, in any revolution, break with
the Constitutional Democrats, whom
they regard as obstructionists to a
realization of their dreams, and whom
they persecute relentlessly whenever
they get in power. This is the normal
course of all European revolutions:
of the First Revolution in France, the
upheavals on the continent in 1848,
the Paris Commune Interlude of 1871,
and the events in Russia, Austria and
Hungary in 1917, '18 and '19.
The anarchists have had their share
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of geniuses, among them such brilliant
and attractive writers as Bakunin,
Proudhon, and Prince Kropotkin; and
it is not hard to understand their in-
fluence upon the young of certain
European countries. In America, how-
ever, their proselytes are generally
those of defective education, indivi-
duals with a flair for wild theory, vic-
tims of academic seclusion, and others
with no knowledge or practical ex-
perience in business, administration
or law.
It is needless to say that not every
radical organization is illegal. A per-
fect right exists to change our system
of government and society by methods
provided in our Constitution, and to
advocate such change by constitu-
tional methods, regardless of the im-
policy or folly of the change advocat-
ed. We are here dealing only with
radicalism which seeks to enforce its
demands by violence.
Such societies are declared unlaw-
ful by Sec. 6655 of our Compiled Laws,
and the next section makes participa-
tion in their activities a felony.
A few years ago the danger of ex-
treme radicalism seemed to lie in the
labor unions, but of late years wiser
counsels have prevailed there. Today
the extreme radicals get more com-
fort in institutions of higher learning,
universities and theological semi-
naries.
In an attempt to gauge the problem
in America, for executive purposes,
our Federal Government a few years
ago made surveys of the extreme rad-








of the above groups..200,000
Total of this type-,-- - 902,000
Elements which experi-
ence has shown are
likely to join in wher-
ever disturbances oc-
cur:





m ents ........................ 50,000
Total of this kind._.. 140,000
Grand total ...... 1,042,000
Extreme radical groups are, as a
rule, loosely organized, the leaders in-
efficient and unreliable, and the mem-
bers undisciplined. All p6sess or
could easily procure small arms, uch
as rifles, pistols, revolvers, shotguns
and bombs. Very few will be found
in their ranks who have had military
training or experience.
Most of our disturbances are indus-
trial and local, although, as at present,
they usually draw their leadership and
inspiration from the anarchist-com-
munist societies, whose aims are not
local or economic but political and
revolutionary. I do not suppose that
the violent radicals are any more nu-
merous now than in 1920; but that
does not mean that we shall not con-
tinue to have violent disturbances
from time to time, for as long a pe-
riod as any of us shall remain on the
scene.
Eighty years have rolled by since
Karl Marx issued his Communist Man-
ifesto calling upon the workers of the
world to unite and overthrow bour-
geois society, yet the proletarian rev-
olution seems as far away in Western
Europe and America as it did then.
Nevertheless our republic is only a
century and a half old, which is noth-
ing, compared with the great empires
of history, and there is no predicting
what may be ahead in the none too
remote future.
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At present the I. W. W. is the most
formidable organization for violent
disturbance, and the Industrial and
economic effects of its activities are
great and baneful. Its leaders have
mapped the country, showing the va-
rious so-called "sympathetic areas".
Wherever a state constabulary is non-
existent or hastily organized, or the
local executives are wavering or sym-
pathetic, or the courts are believed to
be equivocal in their doctrines, there
do these goshawks and turkey buz-
zards of "direct action" wing their
way.
The truth is that in no modern coun-
try, except in the Confederate States
during t~eir brief existence, have
there been so many instances of civil
dist~irbance, demanding the executive
remedy of Martial Rule, as in the
United States. And nowhere (that I
know of-) have the legal rules and
principles defining and explaining that
extreme remedy been better or more
clearly stated.
Martial Law is the child of neces-
sity and is not peculiar to any nation
or type of nation. In Continental Eu-
rope it is called the state of siege.
It exists and has always existed in
England, although some attempt was
formerly made to disguise it with fic-
tions, and to treat it as an illegal ex-
ercise of power, to be followed and
justified by parliamentary acts of in-
demnity. In this country it has been
invoked at all periods of our history,
and by executives of every school of
opinion. Washington, Jefferson, Mad-
ison, Jackson, Tyler, Lincoln, John-
son, Grant, Cleveland, McKinley, Wil-
son, Coolidge, all found it necessary
to use the remedy, either in strict or
qualified form, during their respective
terms of office, as President or as Gov-
ernor of a State, or both. Nowhere
has it been oftener or more vigorously
employed than by the central govern-
ment of the Confederate States during
the Civil War. It has been invoked
continually by governors in the va-
rious states and once by a legislature
-that of Rhode Island.
The jurisdiction has been explained
and upheld quite consistently by near-
ly all state and federal courts, includ-
ing the federal Supreme Court, and is,
perhaps, more or less clearly under-
stood by most lawyers. It is doubtful,
however, whether a majority of lay-
men, including many writers, have a
clear conception of what it is all about,
and why, during a period of Martial
Rule, the familiar constitutional guar-
anties are, in greater or less degree,
suspended. Most citizens approve of
Martial Law, on the vague ground of
necessity, because they have confi-
dence in their government and its
courts; but a certain amount of non-
sense is spoken and written on the
subject whenever Martial Rule ap-
pears, not only by the insurrectionists
and their sympathizers, who may be
depended upon in that particular, but
likewise by persons who are presumed
to know. Among lawyers the difficul-
ty is not that they do not believe that
the jurisdiction properly exists, but
they are not always clear on the legal
formula which establishes it. The
maxims, Necessity knows no law;
Inter arma silent leges; salus repub-
licae suprema lex, etc., are not very
convincing, and, like most legal max-
ims, require explanation to be prop-
erly applied.
It will be my attempt in this paper
to make clear some of these vague
conceptions, and to show how the sum-
mary methods involved in martial law
are entirely constitutional and just as
legal as any other acts devolving upon
the executive department, with espe-
cial reference to the executive of a
state, and of Colorado in particular.
The chief misunderstandings may
be briefly indicated. All state con-
stitutions contain bills of rights sim-
ilar to those in force in Colorado.
Most of these provisions contain lan-
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guage showing on its face that the
guaranty afforded is qualified and sub-
ject to exception in time of insurrec-
tion, but I shall first state them as
though their language purported to be
absolute and without exception. Few
of those who denounce the supposed
violation of the sacred guaranties have
ever read the guaranties, and I shall
state them as they are popularly al-
leged to be, assuming, as I say, that
the Colorado clauses are fairly typical
of other state constitutions.
The courts of justice shall be open
to every person (Art. II, Sec. 6).
No law shall be passed impairing
the freedom of speech; every person
shall be free to speak, write or pub-
lish whatever he will on any subject
(Sec. 10).
All persons shall be bailable except
for capital offenses (Sec. 19).
The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall never be suspended (Sec.
21).
The military shall always be in
strict subordination to the civil power
(Sec. 22).
The right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate (Sec. 23).
The people have the right peaceably
to assemble for the common good.
(Se.c. 24).
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due pro-
cess of law (Sec. 25).
Now, it is argued, these guaranties
are laid down by the sovereign people
in their constitution, the same funda-
mental law which creates the office
of governor. The governor is a mere
creature of this constitution. Without
it, he has no official existence. He
has no powers whatsoever except what
that instrument gives him. He can-
not override any one of its provisions
without being guilty of usurpation.
Therefore, the guaranties above set
forth being of equal dignity with those
creating the governor and defining his
powers, not he or any other depart-
ment of the state can ever abrogate
them. No necessity or emergency, no
matter what, can ever authorize the
governor or any subordinate of his to
disregard the privileges set out in this
bill of rights.
That is the argument.
Before coming to the main answer,
let me call attention to some of the
qualifying phrases I have mentioned,
in the bill of rights itself, which will
serve to make the main answer more
clear and conclusive.
"The courts of justice shall be open
to every person, and", the language
is added, "a speedy remedy afforded
for every injury."
Very good. But suppose the courts
of justice have been closed by a mob,
or, what is the same thing, the forces
of disorder have rendered their pro-
cess ineffective and their protection
nil. Who will open the courts of jus-
tice? Not the mere declaration of
section 6. It is a thing of paper and
printer's ink. If the courts are to be
opened at all, it must be by some
restorative power outside of the court
itself, and not found anywhere in the
phraseology of Article II.
The next guaranty reads: "That no
law shall be passed impairing the free-
dom of speech."
By its very terms, this guaranty im-
poses a limitation on the legislative,
not the executive, department. When
the governor and his military subor-
dinates place a ban on inflammatory
speech-making in the insurrectionary
zone, their action is wholly executive
and does not pretend to be legislative.
The habeas corpus clause, in Sec.
21, is very significant, because, just af-
ter the words "shall never be sus-
pended", we find the phrase "unless
when in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety may require it".
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Section 17, which says that the mili-
tary shall always be in strict subor-
dination to the civil power is fulfilled
by making the governor its command-
er-in-chief, placing it under the chief
civil magistrate of the state, for "the
civil power" means the executive de-
partment no less than the legislative
or judicial. This section clearly re-
lates to the normal times and places
of civil peace, because in insurrection-
ary districts there is no civil power,
at least none that is effective, and the
military cannot be in strict subordi-
nation to the local "civil power" until
the military itself has restored and
revivified that civil power, whereupon
everyone admits that the role of the
military is over. In civil war, the
military cannot be in strict subordina-
tion to something that does not exist,
something which has been overthrown
and which the military is doing its
level best to set upright and enthrone
again, under the command of the chief
civil magistrate the governor.
The right of assembly, like the privi-
lege of the writ of habeas corpus,
was also sadly qualified by the prac-
tical empire-builders who framed the
fundamental law of Colorado. They
said: "That the people have the right
peaceably to assemble for the common
good. and to apply to those invested
with the powers of government for
redress of grievances, by petition or
remonstrance".
And, as to the due process of law
section, it will presently be seen that
the summary methods of martial law
are as much due process of law as any
other executive process.
What then is Martial Law? We may
answer that crudely by saying that it
is the action of the governor in trying,
by means of the instrumentalities giv-
en him in the state constitution, to
fulfill the printary function of his of-
lice, by carrying out Sections 2 and 5
of Article IV.
These provide that the supreme ex-
ecutive power of the state shall be
vested in the governor, who shall take
care that the laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted; and that he shall be com-
mander-in-chief of the military forces
of the state, with power to call out
the militia to execute the laws, sup-
press insurrection or repel invasion.
In his specially concurring opinion
in the Milligan case, Chief Justice
Chase gave the first clear statement, or
rather suggestion, of the three kinds
of military jurisdiction under our
federal Constitution. His classifica-
tion has been adopted by practically
all American courts, text writers and
publicists, and forms the basis for the
manuals and studies of the War De-
partment today.
Not in the language of any author-
ity, but in my own phraseology, these
may be briefly indicated as follows:
First we have Military Law, govern-
ing persons in the military service
and camp followers. It is found in the
Acts of Congress, Articles of War,
General Orders, and Customs of the
Service. It does not apply to civilians,
either in peace or war; and its char-
acteristic tribunal is the Court-Martial,
General, Special and Summary. It is
part of our domestic or municipal law.
Second is Military Government,
sometimes called the law of hostile oc-
cupation. This supersedes, so far as
the commander of the invading forces
deems expedient, the local law in force
before the invasion took place; and
the sanction for that part of the local
law which is allowed to govern is not
the displaced sovereignty of the in-
vaded country, but the will of the mil-
itary commander of the invader. Ex-
amples of this were the military gov-
ernment set up in Mexico by General
Scott in 1847; that of the belligerent
Contederate States when invaded in
the '60s; that enforced, with unneces-
sary rigor, by the German forces in
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Belgium during the world war; and
that of the occupied zone in Germany
from 1918 to 1920. Its sanction is the
will of the military commander under
the direction (with us) of the Presi-
dent. Its legal foundation is Interna-
tional Law. Its practices and prece-
dents are the customs and usages of
war. Its characteristic tribunals are
the Military Commission and the Pro-
vost-Court, superior and inferior.
The third is Martial Law proper. A
more logical descriptive term is Mar-
tial Rule. It relates to domestic terri-
tory in a condition of insurrection or
invasion, when the Constitution and
its civil authorities have been render-
ed inoperative and powerless by the
insurrectionary or invading forces. It
is part of our domestic or municipal
law. In Colorado its foundation is
Article IV, Sections 2 and 5. Its char-
acteristic tribunals are the Military
Commission and the Provost Court.
Its practices and precedents are bor-
rowed from International Law, in the
usages and customs of war. Super-
ficially, therefore, it resembles Mili-
tary Government or hostile occupation.
In the Moyer case, decided in 1905
and reported in 35 Colorado, it was
argued for the petitioner that the gov-
ernor could not declare Martial Law
or find or proclaim that a condition of
insurrection existed, and that that
power resided solely in the legisla-
ture; but the court, in line with the
authorities, held that these were ex-
ecutive functions fundamentally. Ex-
ercising the caution required of the
judicial office, they declined to say that
the state of affairs incident to the
overthrow of civil authority in San
Miguel County and the employment of
the troops by the governor to restore
and maintain order could be called
Martial Law, and confined themselves
rigidly to a decision of the case be-
fore them under our Constitution and
statutes. In point of fact, however,
whenever an insurrection is found by
the governor to exist, for the suppres-
sion of which he sends a military
force into the field, the resultant legal
status is one of Martial Law in the
district, regardless of whether strict
or mild measures of repression are
put into effect, or whether it is called
Martial Law or something else.
Neither the governor, nor the com-
mander of the troops, nor the procla-
mation or declaration of either, is
what suspends or abrogates Constitu-
tional guaranties. Those have already
been suspended and abrogated by the
mob or other violent forces in the lo-
cality. It is mere mockery to assert
that the Constitution is in force in a
district where a mob and its leaders
hold the life and property of the cit-
izen in the hollow of their hands. The
Constitution does have a theoretical or
potential existence there, but it is, for
the time being, a mere shadow; other-
wise the civil authorities would be in
actual control. It is true that the mob
may confine its hostility to some par-
ticular class or business like the coal
industry, or to some locally unpopular
race or the devotees of a form of wor-
ship of which the mob does not ap-
prove. Other citizens may be un-
molested, but it is because the mob
has its attention and fury focused in
another direction. In those cases, the
military commander allows the civil
officers to function in the many duties
which are unobstructed by the riotous
forces; yet, as to that class, race or
industry which the civil authorities'
have shown their impotency to protect,
its constitutional rights have clearly
been torn away from it by the riotous
forces and not by the state executive.
The error into which enthusiasts for
the civil guaranties fall is that they
ignore other articles of the funda-
mental law, of equal dignity. There
are more things in a constitution than
the Bill of Rights. All constitutional
provisions must be construed together,
and harmonized. A workable govern-
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ment could be established without a
bill of rights, but no government could
be set up upon a bill of rights alone.
As said in the Moyer case, power must
reside somewhere. The primary duty
of a state is self-defense and self-pres-
ervation. To the executive is entrust-
ed that duty. In times of tranquillity
people imagine that our civil govern-
ment is part of the law of nature, but
the men who founded the state knew
that the maintenance and vindication
of its authority might be a serious
thing, and that the state executive is
vested with office for more basic pur-
poses than to sign bills and pardon
criminals. Article IV entrusts to our
governor those great but necessary
powers which were entrusted to the
powerful governors of old time, when
the real role of a governor of a colony
or province was better understood, by
people generally, than it is today.
In addition to the constitutional sec-
tions above mentioned, the General As-
sembly has provided as follows:
Comp. L. 1921, Sec. 218:
"When riots, invasion or insurrec-
tion. in the state is made or threat-
ened, the governor shall order the
national guard to repel or repress
the same; Provided that when the
emergency is great and time will not
permit of communication with the
governor, the commanding officer of
any portion of the national guard
stationed at the scene of trouble may
assemble his command and after tak-
ing steps to notify the governor in
the most speedy manner possible, aid
the civil authorities in suppressing
riots or insurrection, or repelling in-
vasion".
See. 219:
"When there is in any town, city
or county a tumult, riot, mob or body
of men, acting together by force with
attempt to commit a felony or to
offer violence to persons or property,
or by force and violence to break and
resist the laws of the state, or when
such tumult, riot or mob is threaten-
ed and the fact is made to appear to
the governor, he may issue his order,
or such sheriff or mayor may issue
a call directed to any commanding
officer of any portion of the national
guard within the limits of their jur-
isdiction, directing him to order his
command to appear at a time and
place designated, to aid the civil
authority to suppress such violence
and to support the law".
The next ensuing sections provide
penalties for disobeying the act, or
failing to respond to such call, provide
for the method of notifying members
of the command, etc.
These sections were enacted in the
session of 1921, and were evidently
prompted by the tramway riots which
occurred in Denver in the summer of
1920.
Section 5495, enacted in 1914, pro-
vides:
"Whenever in the opinion of the
governor a condition of riot, insur-
rection or invasion exists in this
state, or in any county or counties,
city or cities, town or towns, district
or districts in this state, he shall
have the right to declare the state
or any such county or counties, etc.,
to be in a state of riot, or insurrec-
tion, or invasion, by proclamation,
and to prohibit the purchase, etc .....
of any firearms or ammunition, in
the places covered by such proclama-
tion or in any other portions of the
state designated by him during the
time that said proclamation remains
in force".
These statutes are interesting, and
suggest some questions to which we
shall return in a moment.
We have seen that when constitu-
tional protection is wipea out by insur-
rection, it becomes the governor's duty
immediately to restore it. This is or-
dinarily done:
(a) By sending the armed forces of
the state into the field in such num-
bers as may seem best to subdue the
turbulent elements and protect the cit-
izens and industries of the district;
and
(b) By simultaneously issuing a
proclamation of Martial Law, defining
the district wherein the governor finds
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that the civil authority has been over-
thrown, and publishing, for the infor-
mation of everyone, the measures he
finds needful to enforce while the civil
authority is in process of reestablish-
.ment.
The first of these is necessary, as
there can be no Martial Law unless a
military force has been called out. The
second is not necessary, although us-
ual and advisable. If the governor
himself issues no proclamation, the
commander of his troops may; or there
may be fragmentary and supplemental
proclamations from either. In any
event, the will of the governor, and of
the commander of the troops (with the
governor's approval, express or im-
plied) is the law of the district during
the emergency. We have seen that the
practices and precedents to guide the
military forces are borrowed from In-
ternational Law in the usages and cus-
toms of war. This is necessarily true,
because the means to be used, under
the express terms of the constitution,
are the military forces of the state,
and they are trained, equipped, organ-
ized and tactically employed as mili-
tary forces, and not otherwise. The
usages of war, as recognized in Inter-
national Law, are the only precedents
and standards that exist for the em-
ployment of troops. As said by Chief
Justice Taney in Luther v. Borden:
"Unquestionably, a state may use
its military power to put down an
armed insurrection, too strong to be
controlled by the civil authority.
The power is essential to the exist-
ence of every government, essential
to the preservation of order and free
institutions, and is as necessary to
the states of this Union as to any
other government .... It was a state
of war; and the established govern-
ment resorted to the rights and us-
ages of war to maintain itself, and
to overcome the unlawful opposi-
tion".
And in Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S.,
the Federal Supreme Court, after re-
ferring to the Colorado constitution
and supplemental statutes, authorizing
the governor to use the national guard
to suppress insurrection, "made or
threatened", says:
"That means that he shall make
the ordinary use of the soldiers to
that end".
Considering, for a moment, the acts
of the General Assembly, quoted above,
it will be apparent that they fall into
two elements; the first being merely
declaratory, so to speak, of the Con-
stitution, and the second actually leg-
islative in effect. I am inclined to
think that every authority purported
to be conferred on the governor by
section 218, already existed under the
constitution, that is, to order out the
national guard to repress any riot or
insurrection made or threatened, or to
authorize, by general or special order,
his ,subordinate commanders in the
National Guard to act promptly in a
local emergency, notifying him as
quickly as possible. Section 219 is
clearly declaratory, except in that part
which authorizes a sheriff or mayor
to issue a call to a local commander,
and making a response thereto oblig-
atory. The latter is, I think, valid,
unless the governor should counter-
mand the call or give other orders to
the local commander. The governor is
the constitutionally appointed com-
mander-in-chief; and the legislature
cannot dictate how he shall employ
his troops. This is not only clear in
principle but established by authority.
Another point is that when the sheriff
or mayor has issued his call, he is
through. A civil officer cannot com-
mand or control a military force. That
is for its commander, and he takes
orders from and is responsible to no
one but his superior officers. In sup-
pressing the riot, he uses his troops in
the way he thinks best to accomplish
his mission. Section 5495 is clearly
declaratory. When insurrection is
flagrant anywhere, the governor can
regulate or prevent, by any method he
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finds necessary, the sale of arms and
ammunition in Denver, Pueblo, or else-
where.
Nevertheless, it seems that all these
statutes are dictated by good policy,
placing the moral support of the legis-
lature behind any governor who acts
with promptness and energy to restore
civil authority.
It of course results, from the fore-
going principles, that the commanding
officer may seize and imprison anyone
whom he has reason to think is con-
tributing to a continuance of the dis-
order, may direct the activities of the
sheriff or other civil authorities, or
remove them from office, may inter-
dict meetings or the publication or
circulation of inflammatory newspa-
pers and manifestoes, and establish
curfew regulations, etc., for the gov-
ernment of the disturbed area. In the
course of his tactical operations he
may destroy life and property where
necessary; in short, he may resort to
such measures, and the same sort of
measures, as would be proper if the
forces of a foreign government were
invading the district. It is here we
find the proper application of the max-
ims, "The safety of the republic is the
supreme law. Between armed forces
the laws are silent".
Likewise, the governor or command-
er may, if deemed necessary, establish
Military Commissions and Provost
Courts, to try offenses against the
rules of Martial Law and crimes and
disorders generally. These tribunals
are really in the nature of executive
committees to advise the commander
as to the truth in cases where the facts
and circumstances require a full and
fair investigation, and are usually
needed only where operations are on
a large scale. Their findings and
sentences require approval of the con-
vening authority, i. e. the governor or
commander, before they can be execut-
ed. The penalties imposed are, for the
most part, in Martial Law situations,
only temporary measures of safety,
such as imprisonment during the
emergency, until the prisoner can be
tried upon the restoration of civil au-
thority under conditions fair to the
People, expulsion from the district and
the like; but not necessarily so. They
may impose penalties for offenses
against the military regime, like dis-
obedience to orders, breaking regula-
tions, etc., but if the offenses are to
be punished as being against civil laws,
their trial should ordinarily await the
restoration of civil authority. In dis-
cussing this question, in the case of
the United States v. Fischer, 280 Fed.
208, arising out of disorders in Ne-
braska in 1922, Judge Munger said:
"Does the military power in the
occupied territory which is declared
under martial law extend to the trial
and punishment of offenders against
regulations made by the military
commander? Some cases are cited
in support of the proposition that
the military forces can do no more
than to arrest and detain offenders
against the laws of the state until
they can be delivered to the civil au-
thorities for trial, upon the restora-
tion of peace and order. No doubt
the commander may avail himself of
the courts as a means of trial, but
he may also institute tribunals dur-
ing the emergency to deal with of-
fenders in the district. This is es-
pecially true of offenses against the
military regulations, such as these
petitioners committed, acts which
are not offenses against the laws of
the state. . . . Can the sentence of
imprisonment by such a military
tribunal be continued after peace is
declared? This question has not
been the subject of many reported
decisions. The power to punish ser-
ious offenses by imposition of the
death penalty is well understood,
and the lesser punishment of im-
prisonment for life has been sus-
tained. It is stated that during the
Civil War such military commissions
acting under the authority of the
United States held trials and entered
judgment in more than two thous-
and cases, and that sentences of im-
prisonment for terms of years and
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for life were imposed. In cases of
serious offenses it is not doubted
that the sentence of imprisonment
may continue during the war or in-
surrection. If the punishment is in-
flicted but a few days before the es-
tablishment of peace, it would seem
absurd that sentences, otherwise
just, should at once expire. While
the necessity for crushing further
resistence may have passed, the rea-
son for continuance of sentences
theretofore given has not ceased.
The conclusion is that . .. there is
nothing in the exertion of this pow-
er which contravenes the right of
due process of law guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United
States".
Although the governor had thereto-
fore proclaimed the insurrection to be
over, the applications of the prisoners
for their release were denied.
Military Commissions resemble
Courts-Martial in organization and ap-
pearance and are composed of as many
officers as the tactical situation per-
mits, not usually exceeding thirteen.
A commission of less than three would
be contrary to precedent. A judge ad-
vocate and defense counsel are pro-
vided for, and trials proceed, so far as
possible, on the principles of General
Courts-Martial. Provost courts are
one-man tribunals, to handle more or
less petty offenses.
No case involving martial-law courts
has yet arisen in Colorado. They are
merely a detail, however, in the exer-
cise of the admitted powers of the
commander, and are not affected by
the constitutional provisions as to bail,
jury trial, etc. A sentence under them
does not make the prisoner a convict,
although he be imprisoned in the state
penitentiary as a matter of conven-
ience.
It follows, from what has been said,
that the civil courts have no more
right to impede or hamper the gov-
ernor in discharging his duty of sup-
pressing insurrection, than the gov-
ernor has to hamper the courts in
their administration of justice in times
and places of civil peace. Both, when
so acting, act under the constitution.
The executive and the judiciary are
co-ordinate and independent depart-
ments, and neither is above the other.
It is true that the governor has the
power to say whether the time or the
place is one of peace or insurrection,
and no dourt can question his finding.
It is also true that unless the governor
is in the exercise of a constitutional
duty, he is the same as any other citi-
zen and amenable to the process of the
least court in the state. And this
brings us to the question of procedure
in cases of habeas corpus, which are
often brought in behalf of rioters im-
prisoned under executive authority.
Usually the military operations have
been promptly successful to an extent
that has permitted a civil court to sit
in quiet somewhere in or near the
insurrectionary zone. Prompt applica-
tion is there made on behalf of the
prisoner, alleging that he is illegally
restrained of his liberty. At various
times during the last century, a few
courts failed to grasp the principles
involved, held that the executive de-
partment had no right to operate other-
wise than under civil procedure, and
undertook to discharge the prisoner.
Wherever the executive department
stood its ground, the court's theory
was soon reduced to an absurdity. The
only officers who could enforce the
court's order were the sheriff and his
deputies, bailiff, coroner, etc., who had
already proved powerless to deal with
the local disturbances and who could
not possibly, unaided, take away the
prisoner from the military commander
and his soldiers. The only higher au-
thority was the governor, and his was
the very authority by which the pris-
oner was held. If the sheriff tried to
organize a posse comitatus to give bat-
tle to the troops, he must draw his
force from the unorganized militia of
the state, all able-bodied male resi-
dents between the ages of 18 and 45,
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whose commander-in-chief is the gov-
ernor, and whose paramount allegiance
is to him. The governor in a courte-
ous communication would point out to
the court its fundamental error, and
that he could not, consistent with his
oath of office release the prisoner and
thus permit him to help keep alive the
insurrection which the governor was
so anxiously engaged in suppressing.
This very transaction took place in
Ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 802, in dis-
turbances created by the original Ku
Klux Klan. The Supreme Court of
that state soon afterward modified its
views in keeping with the logic of cor-
rect principles.
If a court is sitting and application
for the writ is made, not showing
clearly on its face that the prisoner is
held by proper authority, the court
should ordinarily grant the writ, to be
returnable in the usual way. The na-
tional guard commander should make
return, setting out very fully and in
courteous and respectful language the
basis and reasons for holding the pe-
titioner. Forms for this are found in
the appendix to Davis on Military Law
and are easily adaptable to state prac-
tice. The commander should also, out
of respect for the court, produce the
prisoner, unless tactical considerations
seemed to forbid, in which case an
explanation should be included in the
return. The return showing that the
petitioner is held by the governor's
authority-in connection with the civil
disturbances, the court should, of
course, remand the prisoner. I am
told that during the Cripple Creek in-
surrection, a district judge, supposed
to be in* sympathy with the rioters,
undertook to discharge a military
prisoner, in the face of a proper re-
turn such as above indicated; and that
the Adjutant General, Sherman Bell,
was compelled to rise in open court
and notify the judge that he could not
and would not obey the order. If so,
he did exactly right, as there is no
reason why the executive should back
down in the face of judicial usurpa-
tion, any more than that the judiciary
should tamely submit to executive
usurpation where no authority exists.
These delicate situations show that
bad conflicts may lurk close to the
surface; and the only way to avoid
them, among honest men, is for every-
one to understand the correct princi-
ples which apply.
Time will not permit dealing with,
or even suggesting, many problems
that may arise out of Martial Rule;
but there is one of particular import-
ance, namely, the correct theory of
liability against the governor and
those in military service during the
insurrection. Many a mob leader
comes into court, after peace is re-
stored, loudly complaining that his
sacred rights under the constitution
have been infringed by restraining
him. At all other times he abhors
that document. Cases may conceiv-
ably arise, of course, where the execu-
tives should be held liable; and the
ground for their liability is simply a
wanton abuse of power. In Moyer v.
Peabody, the plaintiff, president of the
Western Federation of Miners, had
been held by the military for two and
a half months during which the insur-
rection was flagrant. After it was
over, and Gov. Peabody's term of of-
fice had expired, Moyer sued him, his
Adjutant General Bell and Bulkley
Wells, a captain of militia, for dam-
ages for that imprisonment, taking the
position that it was wholly illegal in
any event. Judge Lewis disposed of
that contention (148 Fed. 870) upon
the grounds expressed by the state
supreme court in re Moyer in 35 Colo.,
and said:
"It would seem to be in keeping
with principle to hold the defendants
responsible by civil action for a
wanton abuse of power. In Luther
v. Borden it is said: 'No more force
... can be used than is necessary to
accomplish the object, and if the
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power is exercised for purposes of
oppression, or any injury wilfully
done to person or property, the party
by whom, or by whose order, it is
committed would undoubtedly be an-
swerable' . . . (Judge Lewis con-
tinues: ) Reasonable inquiry and
care on their part, under the circum-
stances as they then exist, ought to
relieve them from civil responsibil-
ity." t
The complaint not showing any
wanton abuse of power, he sustained
a demurrer to it. Moyer carried the
case to the Supreme Court where Mr.
Justice Holmes delivered the unani-
mous opinion. After sustaining the
authority of the state officials in every
particular he said:
"No doubt there are cases where
the expert on the spot may be called
upon to justify his conduct later in
court, notwithstanding the fact that
he had sole command at the time
and acted to the best of his knowl-
edge. That is the position of a cap-
tain of a ship. But, even in that
case, great weight is given to his
determination, and the matter is to
be judged on the facts as they ap-
peared then, and not merely in the
light of the event. When it comes
to the decision by the head of the
state upon a matter involving its
life, the ordinary rights of indivi-
duals must yield to what he deems
the necessities of the moment. Pub-
lic danger warrants the substitution
of executive process for judicial
process".
In his argument for the defendant
in Luther v. Borden, Webster very
clearly set forth the discretionary na-
ture of the commander's martial law
authority in the following words:
"I shall only draw attention to the
subject of Martial Law, and in re-
spect to that, instead of going back
to Martial Law as it existed in Eng-
land at the time the charter of
Rhode Island was granted, I shall
merely observe that Martial Law
confers power of arrest, of summary
trial, and prompt execution, and that
when it has been proclaimed the
land becomes a camp, and the law
of the camp is the law of the land.
Mr. Justice Story defines martial
law to be the law of war, a resort
to military authority in cases where
the civil law is not sufficient; and
it confers summary power, not to
be used arbitrarily or for the gratifi-
cation of personal feelings of hatred
or revenge, but for the preservation
of order and public peace. The of-
ficer clothed with it is to judge of
the degree of force that the neces-
sity of the case may demand, and
there is no limit to this, except such
as is to be found in the nature and
character of the exigency".
Had Mr. Webster added that, on the
one hand, when used calmly, reason-
ably, and with the evident desire to
serve the public welfare, though great
errors of judgment may be made, much
latitude is allowed the commander in
the exercise of his authority; and on
the other hand, if an intent to use
power for personal ends, or in an op-
pressive manner be manifested, he is
liable to be held to account, both mili-
tarily and civilly, the outline would
be complete. The rule is that when
martial law exists, either by proclama-
tion or otherwise, the commanding of-
ficer must use his discretion, and is
expected to come as reasonably near
to the line of justice and fair dealing
as the circumstances,' as they appear
at the time, and the information he
has or may easily obtain will permit.
The question naturally arises in any
mind as to possibilities of abuse of
power; but as stated in the Moyer-
case, arguments based on such possi-
bilities are of the weakest variety; be-
cause abuse of power is always pos-
sible in any department of govern-
ment. The political remedy for abuse
of power is by impeachment under
Article XIII. Under Article IV, Sec-
tion 4, of the Federal Constitution the
national government guarantees to
every state a republican form of gov-
ernment. A permanent status of mar-
tial rule would not be republican in
form, and, if attempted, the federal
government would promptly overthrow
it. Cases of governors' exceeding their
authority are very rare, one of the few
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instances arising in West Virginia in
1921. There the Supreme Court of
Appeals, in a series of exceedingly
well-considered cases, had upheld the
executive department in putting an
end to reigns of terror in the coal dis-
tricts. A later governor, evidently
conceiving that he could enjoy the ef-
ficacy of Martial Rule, without the
expense of maintaining troops, de-
clared Martial Law and sent only his
Adjutant General to the district to
take command of the activities of the
sheriff, his deputies and the posse
comitatus. The same judge who had
written most of the previous opinions
denied, in a clear and unanswerable
exposition of the law, the authority in
any executive to inaugurate a military
jurisdiction when he can get along
without the military itself. (88 W. Va.
713; 108 S. E. 428; 24 A.L.R. 1178).
It is worth noticing that state police
are not state troops, but are civil
police, and no martial law measures
can be predicated upon their use alone,
although under martial rule they can
be used by, and may cooperate with
the military. Martial Law is an ex-
treme measure, and efficient local
peace officers, aided by a permanent
state police, are desirable to make the
necessities for Martial Rule as infre-
quent as possible. These would be
more infrequent if the civil officers
would do their duty. As pointed out
by the, Chief Justice in the Milligan
case, the"local civil officers may even
be the allies of insurrection. More
often, they allow themselves to be
intimidated, and excuse their inaction
by claiming it is impolitic to enforce
the law or prosecute the rioters; or
they pretend to regard the disturbance
as a private quarrel in which they
should not "take sides"; meaning that
the mob is free to murder and loot to
the extent of its capacity. The victims
of its hostility must then defend them-
selves as best they can, and when they
do so, are often criticized by a large
section of the pulpit and press for car-
rying on a "private war".
The failure on the part of peace of-
ficers and prosecutors to do their duty
results in a denial to the citizen of
protection and redress under the civil
phases of the constitution; it amounts
to a usurpation by such local officers
of a discretion which is not even
lodged in the legislature but is for-
bidden to any department, namely, a
discretion to abandon the inhabitants,
property and industries of a given lo-
cality to the will and desires of a mob.
As they must be protected somehow,
it thus becomes necessary to send in
the troops, where they might not have
been needed if the local prosecutors
and peace officers had made a serious
attempt to carry out their duties in
the first instance; and the continual
failure of county and district officers
causes many persons to assume that
no authority is ever very effective ex-
cept the military.
In conclusion, I think the most im-
portant points are:
1st. That the civil guaranties are
not suspended by the executive, but, in
theory and in fact, by the mob or in-
surrection that temporarily wipes out
constitutional protection.
2nd. That, in restoring the constitu-
tional regime, the governor and his
officers use the armed forces of the
state in accordance with the customs
and usages of war, and any measures
they in good faith adopt are due
process of law.
3rd. That, when civil authority has
been restored, they can be held liable
civilly and politically, only for a
wanton or wilful abuse of power in
carrying out their functions.
It Was Catching
Nutz was arrested on a charge of
driving under the influence of liquor.
cand %alth%t mtr ft rtircmfeftdfalw.
-Denver Paper.
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Advice to the Tyro
At Last a Guide to the Trial Lawyer Appears
Some Hints on the Trial of a Lawsuit, by Rolla R. Longenecker, Foreword by
John Henry Wigmore, The Lawyers Cooperative Publishing
Company, Rochester, N. Y., 1927.
By ALLEN MoORE, Denver Bar
HE tyro in the profession of law,
as well as any other novice,
must learn the rules of the game
from any available source. The young
lawyer is handicapped in the begin-
ning by his almost complete ignorance
of practice and procedure, and this
applies most particularly to his lack
of knowledge with respect to the trial
of lawsuits. Rolla R. Longenecker, of
the Chicago Bar, in his "Some Hints
on The Trial of a Lawsuit" has writ-
ten a book which will be of invaluable
assistance both to the young lawyer
in familarizing him with the practical
phases of the incidents of a lawsuit
and to-the experienced trial lawyer in
pointing out bad habits he may have
acquired and in revealing a whole new
field with respect to the behavior and
psychology of witnesses.
In a brief foreword Dean John
Henry Wigmiore of Northwestern Uni-
versity points out that all the applied
sciences, of which Law is one, depend
for their final operation on experience
in their application, because they deal
more or less with human nature as
their material. A lawyer deals, first,
with his own human nature, and sec-
ondly, other people's. He must, first,
study his own handling of himself in
his practice, an! secondly, study the
behavior of the judges, clients, wit-
nesses, and other lawyers. Professor
Wigmore then laments that few law-
yers have had the impulse to record,
systematize, and publish their accumu-
lated experience in human nature, for
the benefit of their successors, stating
that they can be numbered on the
fingers of two hands, and that such a
record is a public benefit. He then
bestows high praise on Mr. Longe-
necker's book as follows:
"This book is a public benefit. If
only the young lawyer for whom it
is intended would not merely read
it, but believe it and master it and
act on its advice, the next genera-
tion of practitioners would achieve
in this field an appreciable stage of
real progress-that progress which
is the distinguishing privilege of the
human race."
In simple language the author has
set down the essentials to guide one
who is ambitious to become a trial
lawyer, always keeping in mind the
lawyer recently admitted to the bar.
who seeks information to prepare him-
self for trial work. While the work is
an outline and not exhaustive, it re-
lates in a most practical way what to
do, rather than what not to do and
hence is entirely constructive.
The general incidents arising during
the trial are given from the time the
trial is set until the final entry of judg-
ment and the necessary action and
motions to protect a client's rights
prenaratory to an appeal. If an appeal
is desired, are given.
The most novel feature of this help-
ful book is the author's division of wit-
nesses into fourteen main groups as
follows:
The Bold Types of Witnesses.
The Cautious Types of Witnesses.
The Evasive Types of Witnesses.
The Expert Witness.
The Female Witness.
The Friendly Types of Witnesses.
The Hostile Types of Witnesses.
The Impartial Types of Witnesses.
The Lying Witness.
The Partisan Types of Witnesses.
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Public Officials as Witnesses.
The Timid Types of Witnesses.
The Unfortunate Types of Witnesses.
The Venal Types of Witnesses.
Each group is analyzed and defined
generally, then special types of each
are discussed under the following
plan:
"First, the witness is defined and
discriminated from other kinds.
"Second, his characteristics are
pointed out.
"Third, hints on how to control
the type of witness for eAamination
in chief are given in detail.
"Fourth, hints for the cross-exam-
ination of the types are noted."
In his preface, Mr. Longenecker
says:
"The student always profits
through study. The fluent, clever
lawyer relies too much upon his
natural talent, and with success be-
comes lazy.
"The ideal lawyer is a student, ex-
ercises patience, prepares for each
new conflict in court and thus in-
creases his ability and skill, while
his clever, talented,. and lazy op-
ponent becomes less and less clever
from lack of brain exercise."
The book is fairly packed with prac-
tical, concise, constructive suggestions
on preparation for trial; demeanor in
court of lawyer and witness; selec-
tion of the jury; the trial itself, char-
acteristics of evidence; interviewing
witnesses before trial, examination of
witnesses; direct, cross-examination,
re-direct and re-cross; presentation of
documentary evidence; trial practice;
objections; argument; instructions;
special proceedings; verdicts and the
necessary steps to be taken after ver-
dict, such as motion for new trial, ar-
rest of judgment, entry of judgment
or preparation for appeal.
In the appendix, the author has in-
corporated the Canons of Professional
Ethics, also Canons of Judicial Ethics
of the American Bar Association with
an index of each. The book also in-
cludes an excellent index for it is the
hope of the author that his work may
be used in the court room as well as
in the office in analyzing witnesses.
A study of Mr. Longenecker's excel-
lent "Hints" should do much to point
the way and arouse latent talent and
prevent one from committing errors
in the trial of a lawsuit due to ignor-
ance and lack of practice. Every tyro
in the law, and who is not a tyro,
should have a copy of this book on
his desk.
(NOTE-Suitable legal book reviews
will be gladly received by the Editors.)
NOTE!
As one of the purposes of THE
RECORD is to afford a means for free
expression by members of the bar
on subjects of benefit to the profes-
sion, and as the widest range of
opinion is desirable in order that
the different aspects of these mat-
ters may be presented, the editors
assume no responsibility for the
opinions in signed articles, the fact
of their publication indicating only
the belief of the editors that the
subject treated merits consideration
and attention.
No Lack of Provisions
"You say you were once cast away
on a desert island, entirely without
food. How did you live?"
"Oh, I happened to have an insur-
ance policy in my pocket and I found
enough provisions on it to keep me
alive till I was rescued."
Reason to Worry!
"Now, tell me, do Frenchmen under-
stand American slang?"
"I guess some of them do. Why
ask?"
"Well, you see, my youngest daugh-
ter is to be married in Paris, and the
Count has cabled me to come across."
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Attachments in California
By JACOB J. LiFHERMAN,
Former Trustee Denver Bar Association, Now of the Los Angeles Bar
(This is the second of a series of articles on comparisons and contrasts
between Colorado and California law and procedure.)
S omany claims emanate fromColorado and are sent for collec-
tion to, or enforcement in, Cali-
fornia, that an understanding of the
theory of attachments in the latter
State is not only of interest but of
vital concern to Colorado lawyers.
Instead of having attachments based
upon actions in contract plus the filing
of an affidavit showing some special
ground for attachment, as is the case
in Colorado, attachments in California
are issued in all cases in which (1) the
action is "upon a contract, express or
implied, for the direct payment of
money, where the contract is made or
is payable in this State (the State of
California), and is not secured by any
mortgage or lien upon real or personal
property, or any pledge of personal
property, or if originally so secured
such security has, without any act of
the plaintiff or the person to whom
the security was given, become value-
less"; (2) where the action is "upon
a contract, express or implied, against
a defendant not residing in the State
of California, or who has departed from
the State, or who cannot after due
diligence be found within the State or
who conceals himself to avoid service
of summons"; and (3) where the ac-
tion is "against a defendant, not resid-
ing in the State of California or who
has departed from the State, or who
cannot after due diligence be found
within the State, or who conceals him-
self to avoid service of summons to
recover a sum of money as damages,
arising from an injury to property in
this State, in consequence of negli-
gence, fraud or other wrongful act".
Thus it will be seen that, except in
the case of actions against non-resi-
dents or those departing from the
State, etc., where the action is for
negligence, fraud or other tort, all at-
tachments must be based upon actions
upon contract, express or implied, for
the direct payment of money. Conse-
quently, actions for mere breach of
contract do not justify an attachment,
excepting, apparently, any action upon
a contract against a non-resident or a
defendant absconding or concealing
himself.
However, in the case of actions
against residents in the State of Cali-
fornia where the contract is for the
direct payment of money, another re-
quisite of the California Code of Civil
Procedure which is of considerable
embarrassment to forwarding attor-
neys is that condition which allows at-
tachments only in cases where the
contract is made or is payable in the
State of California. In other words,
no attachment can be obtained in the
State of California against a resident
where the contract is made and pay-
able outside the State of California.
Promissory notes made and payable in
Colorado, therefore, cannot be a basis
for attachment and litigants here are
therefore compelled to resort to the
ordinary law suit with the usual
chances of recovery upon execution.
Attachments are issued after the
filing of the complaint and the issu-
ance of summons and filing of an affi-
davit showing that the plaintiff is en-
titled to the attachment and showing
the amount of indebtedness, and also
containing a statement that the at-
tachment is not sought and that the
action is not prosecuted to hinder,
delay or defraud any creditor of the
defendant. Before issuing the writ
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the Clerk must require a written un-
dertaking on the part of the plaintiff
in a sum of not less than $200.00 and
not exceeding the amount claimed by
the defendant, with sufficient sureties,
to the effect that if the defendant re-
covers judgment, the plaintiff will pay
all costs that may be awarded to the
defendant and all damages which he
may sustain by reason of the attach-
ment, not exceeding the sum specified
in the undertaking. Inasmuch as a
householder as well as a freeholder
may be sureties on such an undertak-
ing, the Code provides that at any
time after the issuing of the attach-
ment, but not later than five (5) days
after actual notice of the levy thereof,
the defendant may except to the suffi-
ciency of the sureties. The hearing
upon such exception is had, at which
time the sureties must justify before a
Judge or County Clerk and prove their
financial responsibility upon the bond.
Where there is a failure of such justi-
fication, the writ of attachment must
be vacated by the Judge or Clerk.
In cases of debts, etc. due by others
to the defendant, the same attachment
writ is served upon such parties in-
stead of a writ of garnishment issuing,
as in Colorado, in aid of execution or
attachment. On occasions, certain
banks here take the position that they
will not answer the writ of attach-
ment, or as we would call it in Colo-
rado, the garnishment. In such case
it becomes necessary to obtain an Or-
der of Court directing the garnishee
to appear either before the Court or a
Referee appointed for the purpose, to
be examined as to the alleged indebt-
edness-a laborious ind at times an
expensive procedure.
In practice the attorney for plaintiff
is required at the time of the request
for writ of attachment, to file a state-
ment with the Clerk of the Court as
to what he proposes to attach and the
value thereof. Likewise, plaintiff or
his attorney is required to give written
instructions to the sheriff specifying
what is to be attached.
Where a third party claims to own-
the property attached, the Code pro-
vides in cases of execution as well as
attachment, that such third party may
file a written claim verified by his
oath or that of his agent, setting out
his right to the possession of such
property, and serve same upon the
sheriff. Whereupon, it becomes the
duty of the plaintiff or the person in
whose favor the writ of attachment
or execution runs, to furnish on de-
mand of the sheriff indemnification to
the latter against such claim in a sum
equal to double the value of the prop-
erty; otherwise the sheriff is not
bound to keep the property so levied
upon.
Many unexpected third party claims
arise, particularly because of the de-
fective status of the law of California
in relation to contracts of sale. In
Colorado, the law still provides that a
contract for sale of personal property
which retains the title in the seller is
good only between the parties to such
contract and void as to third parties,
and of course the method of protect-
ing the seller is to make a definite
sale and take back a chattel mortgage
in statutory form and record same in
statutory manner. While California
provides for chattel mortgages, and
also specifies the form of the chattel
mortgage and requires not only that
the form be substantially in accord-
ance with the statutory form-and shall
be acknowledged before recording, but
also requires that all of the parties
thereto shall make affidavit to the ef-
fect that such chattel mortgage is
made not for the purpose of hindering,
delaying or defrauding creditors, etc.,
yet there still persists here the recog-
nition of the rule that a title does not
pass in property until so intended.
Consequently, instead of resorting to
the filing of chattel mortgages and
placing same of record, installment
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houses and others make a lease con-
tract or agreement of sale upon in-
stallments, retaining the title in the
seller. This is not required to be re-
corded. Your purchaser, therefore,
buys at his peril and the party caus-
ing a levy of attachment or execution
to be made therefor, never knows
when a third party claim may be filed
on behalf of some holder of an install-
ment contract, and upon the filing of
such claim it becomes necessary that
the so-called "seller" or third party
claimant should be paid the amount of
his claim unless the attaching party
or execution creditor presents to the
sheriff within five days a verified state-
ment that the claim of title under the
conditional sale is void for reasons
therein specified and delivers to the
officer a good and sufficient indemnity
bond which bond is made both to the
officer and seller or third party claim-
ant.
Canadian Justice
By J. P. O'CONNELL,
Assistant District Attorney of the City and County of Denver
N the evening of July 18, 1927,
one George McDonald and his
wife Doris, together with one
Frank Price, anxious to leave Canada
before being apprehended and charge-t
for having issued spurious checks, en-
gaged the services of a taxi driver to
take them from Montreal to Rochester.
New York. When about fifty miles out
of Montreal, they killed the driver and
taking his money and the machine, fled
to the United States.
The McDonalds, travelling under the
alias of "Carter" arrived in Denver
about August 5th. While here they
spared neither storemen nor bankers
in their successful campaign to see
just how much they could raise on
wholly worthless paper. They then
proceeded to Butte, Montana where
they were arrested by local police act-
ing upon wires from Denver. After
being returned to Denver their real
identity was discovered from finger
prints, etc. and the Canadian auther-
ities were notified.
In due course Canadian Authorities
arrived with extradition papers. These
were the most complete that the writer
has ever seen. Not a detail had been
overlooked and it was apparent that
no expense had been spared in prepar-
ing them. Canadian Justice thinks
only of results. No matter how costly
the securing of detailed information,
if it is a link in the chain, the Canad-
ian authorities see that it is secured.
The case of The King as George Mc-
Donald and Doris McDonald was call-
ed for trial on the morning of Decem-
ber 6, 1927 in a little town called Val-
ley Field in the province of Quebec.
about forty miles from Montreal. It is
a French speaking community and the
trial therefore was conducted in both
French and English. Everything said
in French was translated into English
and vice versa.
A jury panel of about one hundred
had been summoned for service. These
men were selected by lot by the Sheriff
of the County. The writer was credi-
bly informed that all juries in that
community are for conviction. Once a
man is apprehended it is almost taken
for granted by the jury that he is
guilty.
The defendants were represented by
the most able lawyers in Montreal.
They had been appointed by the Court
and although the case lasted nearly
two weeks, they received nothing for
their services. The attorney for the
Crown received $20 a day when en-
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gaged on the case. (He is allowed to
have his own private practise).
The jury selected was composed of
six Frenchmen and six Englishmen.
At the conclusion of the case both de-
fendants were found guilty and the
Court immediately pronounced the
death sentence setting March 23rd as
the execution date.
Procedure
The procedure differed in some re-
spects from that in our courts as did
the conduct of the case. The principal
differences noted were:
1. Selection of the jury.
2. Rule as to objections and excep-
tions.
3. Instructions.
4. Attitude of officials and citizens.
5. Attitude of the press.
Selection of Jury
The jurors are called one at a time
and accepted or rejected before another
juror is called. While inquiry may be
made, in this case not a question was
asked of a single juror concerning his
qualifications to sit. Under the law
the defense had a right to 20 preemp-
tory challenges for each defendant,
giving them a total of 40. The Crown
had but 4 in all. As each juror is call-
ed however the Crown has the right
to ask him to stand aside. He then
waits until the panel has been exhaust-
ed before again being called into the
box. In the McDonald case the defense
exercised all its challenges but enough
of the panel remained so that it was
unnecessary to recall any who had
been asked to stand aside.
Objections and Exceptions
It is not necessary for the defense to
object to the admission of incompetent
or otherwise objectionable testimony
as the Crown assumes the responsibil-
ity. If such testimony is admitted it
is error regardless of failure to object.
The reason given to the writer by
Judges with whom he talked, was the
severity of the Canadian law and the
almost certainty of conviction. This
forces them to throw every possible
safe guard around the person on trial.
Instructions of the Court
The system of instructing the jury is
the same as that used in our Federal
Courts. It consists of a statement of
the law mingled with the comments of
the Court on evidence produced or the
failure to produce evidence. It Is
stated that perjured testimony does not
escape the trained mind of the judge
as it does the jurors in so many cases.
Attitude of Officials and Citizens
In the many courts visited by the
writer he saw none of the maudlin
sympathy toward the defendant on the
part of citizens or court attendants
that is found so often here. Inquiry
showed that any act on the part of an
official which would tend to create sym-
pathy for the defendant met with the
Court's disapproval at once. In the
McDonald case the mere putting of an
arm on defendant's shoulder caused the
removal of the Matron in charge of the
woman prisoner.
Attitude of the Press
The cases in the province of Quebec
are tried in the court room and not in
the Newspapers. All that the papers
print is the testimony given and not
the views of the editors upon the guilt
or innocence of the accused. The judges
by use of contempt proceedings control
the conduct of the papers and are thus
enabled to see that real justice is
meted out.
The cost of the case of Crown vs. Mc-
Donald, including capture, extradition
and trial, was $60,000. The utter dis-
regard of expense, the surety of pun-
ishment and the absolute certainty
that the verdict will not be interfered
with by pardoning boards undoubtedly
account for the low crime rate in Can-
ada.
(NOTE-Mr. O'Connell was taken to
Canada as a witness in this case).
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Committee Reports
Professional Ethics
HE Committee on Professional
Ethics reports the following
statements of questions sub-
mitted to it in respect of professional
conduct and its opinions thereon:
A.
Statement
An attorney has been appointed
by the Court to represent a non-
resident defendant in a divorce ac-
tion, the grounds being desertion.
The attorney notified the defendant
and asked her whether she intended
to contest the action. In reply the
defendant stated that it was impos-
sible for her to live with the plain-
tiff, but that she was desirous of re-
ceiving some contribution from the
husband for the support of their son.
She also states that she does not
care to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Colorado Courts for the reason
that the plaintiff might seek the cus-
tody of their son. The attorney has
attempted to induce the plaintiff to
enter into a stipulation which may
be filed in Court providing that he
will pay a certain amount monthly
for the support of his son. The
plaintiff has refused to do this. The
last letter which the attorney wrote
to the defendant was some six
months ago, but the defendant has
not answered.
In view of the foregoing facts,
would it be a breach of duty on the
part of the attorney to allow the
plaintiff to proceed with his action
for divorce without raising the ques-
tion of the support money and with-
out further notifying the defendant,
or informing the Court?
Opinion
The attorney appointed by the
court has not authority to appear for
the defendant. His duty is confined
to conducting the hearing for the de-
fendant, cross-examining plaintiff's
witnesses and securing a fair and
impartial hearing. From his state-
ment, In the opinion of the Commit-
tee, he has no authority to urge the
matter of support but should make
known the whole situation to the
court. It is, also, a part of his duty
to inform the defendant of the situa-
tion and the possible consequences
of her failure to appear.
B.
Statement
I am informed and believe the in-
formation to be correct that at a re-
cent divorce trial in the Denver Dis-
trict Court, one of the lawyers for
the defendant, the husband, made an
opening statement, which he appar-
ently believed would arouse the an-
ger of the plaintiff, who was the wife
of the defendant, his client. As this
counsel for the defendant finished
his opening statement, he passed be-
hind the plaintiff, who was seated
behind her counsel, and leaning
down close to her, said in subdued
tones, "Did that get your shanty
Irish up?" Personally, I think this
is more a matter for the Grievance
Committee than for your Committee.
but as it happens so often, I doubt
that the attorney for the plaintiff
who heard these remarks would care
to take any action. For that reason,
I submit it to you and in the event
your Committee is of the opinion
that this conduct is unethical, I sug-
gest that the opinion be published in
the Record as heretofore.
Opinion
The Committee cannot criticize
what the attorney said in his open-
ing statement since it does not know
what was said. If it referred to mat-
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ters competent, relevant and mater-
ial to the issues of the case it is im-
material whether it would make or
was intended to make the plaintiff
angry; otherwise it is contrary to
Canon 18. But in the opinion of the
Committee what the attorney said to
the plaintiff was, unless to be ex-
cused or explained by something
which does not appear, unethical in
the extreme.
C.
The President of the Association
has requested the opinion of the
Committee with regard to the pro-
priety of publication in a newspaper
of a simple professional card.
Opinion
There is nothing objectionable in
the opinion of the Committee in a
card bearing no more than name,
profession, office address and tele-
phone number. The publication of
such a card is a matter of personal
taste but is not per se improper.
Canon 27.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARi) D. UPHAMN, Chairman,
For the Committee.
Recent Trial Court Decisions
(Editor's Note.-It Is intended in
each issue of the Record to note in-
teresting current decisions of all local
Trial Courts, Including the United
States District Court, State District
Courts. the County Court, and the Jus-
tice Courts. The co-operation of the
members of the Bar is solicited In mak-
Ing this department a success. Any at-
torney having knowledge of such a
decision is requested to phone or mail
the title of the case to Victor Arthur
Miller, who will digest the decision for
this department. The names of the
Courts having no material for the cur-
rent month will be omitted, due to
lack of space.)
Central Electric Supply Company,
Plaintiff, vs. The Cosmopolitan
Hotel and Broadway Theatre Com-
pany, et al, Defendants, No. 95339,
Division 4, District Court, City
and County of Denver.
Facts: Colburn on and prior to De-
cember 1, 1924 was owner of contract
for purchase of real estate consisting
of Metropole Hotel and Broadway
Theatre building and ground upon
which same situate and land adjoining
same on North. Under date of Decem-
ber 1, 1924, previous owner of said
property executed deed of the property
to Colburn and Colburn executed trust
deed on said property for $350,000.00
payable to the previous owner and also
mortgage securing $1,750,000.00 bonds
on said property. Under date of De-
cember 2, 1924, Colburn executed con-
veyance of said property to Hotel Com-
pany, subject to said encumbrances.
December 11, 1924, additional money
on purchase price was paid, part being
paid by Hotel Company and part by
Mortgage Company, which made the
$1,750,000.00 loan, and all of said deeds
and encumbrances were placed in es-
crow to be delivered on payment of
$200,000.00. December 11, 1924, Hotel
Company took possession of property
and operated Metropole Hotel. January
5, 1925, work of excavation for build-
ing of hotel building on ground to
north of old building was commenced
and thereafter work of building such
hotel building and altering old build-
ing was continued until completion.
January 29, 1925, the Mortgage Com-
pauy paid $200,000.00 additional on
purchase price of property and said
deeds and encumbrances were deliver-
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,d and recorded. February 7, 1925,
Mortgage Company paid the $350,000.00
first encumbrance securing unpaid bal-
ance of purchase price and the encum-
brance was released. The proceeds of
the $1,750,000.00 loan were used in part
for payment of greater part of pur-
chase price of property, as above
stated, and in part for payment to
principal contractor and certain sub-
contractors of cost of construction of
new building (none of such amounts
having been paid directly by Mortgage
Company to any of the lien claimants
in question).
In suit brought to foreclose mechan-
ic's lien claims.
Held: For lien claimants.
Reasoning: Under Colorado statutes,
Hotel Company at time of commence-
ment of work had an equitable title
and upon the subsequent recording of
the deeds the fee simple title acquired
by same related back to and connected
with such equitable title; that under
the Colorado statutes, the mortgage
not having been recorded prior to thE
commencement of work and all the lien
claims dating their priority from the
date of commencement of work, the
mechanic's lien claims were prior to
the mortgage, as to the land, the old
building and the new building; and
that the priority given by the statute
to mechanic's lien claims over mort-
gages not recorded at the time of com-
mencement of work is not affected by
fact that the deeds and mortgages were
executed and placed in escrow prior to
the commencement of work or by the
fact that part of the money secured by
the mortgage was used to pay part of
the purchase price of the property or
to pay off the purchase price encum-
brance on the property or to pay part
of the cost of erecting the new build-
ing.
In The District Court
DIVISION NO. 5
JUDGE CHARLES C. SACKMAN
Clark vs. Milliken et al No. 82716
Facts: Plaintiff sues on note signed
by defendant Company by W. B. Milli-
ken, Manager. Note endorsed by Milli-
ken -as individual and Jamison by Milli-
ken, Attorney in Fact. Joint and sev-
eral judgment rendered against the
Company, Milliken and Jamison. Jami-
son prosecutes a writ of error in Su-
preme Court while the Company and
Milliken stand on judgment. Execu-
tion issued against debtor of Milliken
and enough money is secured to satisfy
judgment. Judgment although paid
was not released but was assigned to
Milliken's son. Jamison moves to have
judgment satisfied in full.
Held: Motion granted and order
entered to satisfy judgment on books
in Clerk's office.
Reasoning: Release of one or more
joint or joint and several obligors re-
leases the others. While Sec. 5125
Compiled Laws '21 seems to give credi-
tor the right to release one obligor up-
on payment of his proportionate share
of a joint and several obligation, this
does not apply where the entire indebt-
edness is paid. The assignment was
a subterfuge-the payment extinguish-
ed the debt and released all other joint
obligors, leaving the party paying
more than his share to his remedy in
equity for a contribution.
If Supreme Court holds judgment
final against Jamison or if writ of
error dismissed, Milliken Is entitled to
contribution.
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In The United States District
Court
JUDGE J. FOSTER SYMES
In the Matter of L. Clifford Hoover
Bankrupt No. 5811
Facts: In May 1926 the Bankrupt
agreed to lease a quarter section of
land upon which he was to plant a
crop, one third of the crop to be paid
as rent and one third to be applied on
a past indebtedness owing the Lessor
by the Bankrupt. The written lease
executed in September provided that
two-thirds of the crop was to be paid
as rent. The instrument was executed
within four months next prior to the
adjudication of bankruptcy and was
not recorded until after bankruptcy.
The instrument was never executed or
recorded as a chattel mortgage. One
third of crops paid. Claim made for
an additional one third as secured by
lien. It was conceded that the oral'
agreement not the written one con-
trolled.
Held: Claim not secured by lien.
Reasoning: A tenant cultivating
land for part of the crop is tenant of
owner and upon bankruptcy of tenant
owner can claim his interest regard-
less of bankruptcy. The lease as it
was not recorded till after bankruptcy
is not a lien and amounts to nothing
more than an assignment made within
four months prior to bankruptcy. Even
had it been executed and recorded
prior to the four months period it
would not control unless it complied
with the Colorado Chattel Mortgage
Act. Therefore the one-third share
claimed is an asset of the bankrupt
estate.
In The United States District
Court
JUDGE J. FOSTER SYMES
L. B. Bromfield, Receiver vs. Staley et
al No. 8525
Facts: Complaint filed in August,
1927, Last service of process, October
24, 1927. All defendants entered into
stipulation granting time to plead.
One defendant filed motion to dismiss
in September 1927. Other defendants
filed motions to dismiss on merits be-
fore expiration of the then term of
Court. In new term Defendants filed
an Affidavit of Disqualification of
Judge setting forth bias and preju-
dice predicated on remarks of the
Judge in the course of prior criminal
proceedings before him in which none
of defendants were parties except
Staley against whom the proceedings
were dismissed by the Court. Affilavit
further set forth prejudice as shown
by remarks of Court in other judical
proceedings before him and the Courts
opinion in a similar case in which de-
fendants were not parties.
Held: Motion denied.
Reasoning: Affidavit filed too late.
Remarks of Court in former cases
properly made from the Bench in the
course of judical proceedings do not
show bias or prejudice.
New Rules
Presiding Judge McDonough,
announces that copies of the new
District Court Rules will be
mailed to Attorneys in the course
of the next two weeks. He indi-
cates only slight changes: the
method of case allotment and
new rules to conform with past
practice.
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The Three "Mugs"
Roscreaman's Purchase of Cow
Tipperarymen "Done"
EFORE Judge Wakely at Leix
Circuit Court, Patrick J. Brophy,
Roscrea, sued Geo. Moynihan,
Rathdowney, for £25 damages for
breach of warranty and fraudulent
misrepresentation in the sale of a cow.
Mr. A. C. Houlihan, solicitor appear-
ed for Brophy; Mr. E. T. Ryan, solr.,
(Ryan and Son), appeared for the de-
fence.
Having heard the evidence on both
sides at great length, judgment was
reserved to Maryborough.
In giving his decision the judge said
that this was rather a serious case.
Brophy, the plaintiff, was, he under-
stood, a dairy-man and had a grocery
besides, and he wanted to buy a milch
cow last October. He had asked a
brother or cousin of his called John
Brophy if he knew of any man who
had a good cow. John Brophy told
him that Moynihan was a likely man
to have a suitable cow, and on the
23rd October Patk. Brophy, with John
Brophy and John Keeshan went there.
They saw the cow. Brophy and his
witnesses said that Brophy said "She
does not look very like having milk,"
and Moynihan said that she had and if
she was properly worked up and fed
she would have 15 or 16 quarts a day.
£23 was eventually agreed on as the
price, and his (judges) opinion was
that a cow that had only calved 8 days
and therefore was not at her tip-top,
to give 15 or 16 quarts in October was
rather a bargain for £23. One of the
things relied on by Brophy was that
Moynihan said the cow would give 15
quarts. Brophy also asked Moynihan
did she cleanse alright, and he said
she did; he asked was the calf all
right, and Moynihan said it was. The
facts were that the cow calved a
month before her time; that the calf
died after it was dropped and the cow
took three days to cleanse. And the
veterinary surgeon when he saw the
cow in November, found her still in a
very bad way.
"I could not understand," proceeded
Judge Wakely, "the way Moynihan and
John Brophy and Keeshan gave their
evidence. There never seemed to be
three such mugs, but it may be that
they were all lies. I never thought a
Queen's Co. man could 'do' a Tipper-
ary man (laughter), but here, if
Brophy's story is true, a Queen's Co.
man 'did' three Tipperary men" (re-
newed laughter). Brophy seemed to
be a very decent, straightforward man.
He admitted he did not ask Moynihan
how much milk the cow gave, but
Moynihan admitted he told him that
he milked the cow at dinner time, and
the milking of cows three times a day
was the best way of bringing them to
their milk. Moynihan swore that the
cow was giving five to seven quarts at
that time, that he told Brophy the cow
could be worked up to 16 quarts. He
said that the cow had an accident.
She was a cow that was either on her
fifth or sixth calf. Of course, a man
that was told that a cow had an acci-
dent, and had a premature birth a
month or so before her time, and had
retained her cleansing for three days
would not have touched the cow.
When Brophy got the cow home, the
cow was giving 7 to 9 pints a day; the
best he could get was 9, and one day
she gave 10 pints.
The Judge held that Moynihan com-
mitted a breach of warranty, and he
also held that there was fraudulent
misrepresentation. The unfortunate
Brophy had to buy another cow. He
allowed the full amount, and gave a
decree for £25, with £6 14s. wit-
nesses' expenses,
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Earnest Encore
Chemist (to motorist who had been
carried into his shop after an accident)
-"Yes, sir; you rather a bad smash,
but I managed to bring you to."
Motorist-"I don't remember. Do
you mind bringing me two more?"-
Happy Mag (London)
One of Those Big Moments
"Are you still engaged to that home-
ly Smith girl?"
"No, I'm not!"
"Good for you, old man. You had
my sympathy when you were. How
(lid you get out of it?"
"Married her."-Kansas City Star.
A Sedative
Doctor: "Your husband must have
absolute quiet. Here is a sleeping
draught."
Wife: "And when do I give it to
him?"
Doctor: "You don't give it to him-
you take it yourself."
All Depends
Stranger-I say, friend, at what
price do you value that cow which was
tied down the road this morning?
Farmer-Are you the tax assessor
or did you hit her with your car?-
Public Service Magazine.
English Ain't No Snap
"I once tried to teach a little Ala-
bama boy to speak pure English,"
writes Octavus Roy Cohen. "I'll never
forget the despairing way he said to
me at the end of the thirtieth or for-
tieth lesson: 'Dey aren't no "ain't
you," is dey? It's "aren't you," ain't
it?' "
Needed Encouragement
Customer: "You sold me a car about
two weeks ago."
Salesman: "How do you like it?"
Customer: "I want you to tell me
everything you said about the car all
over again. I'm getting discouraged."
-L. & N. Employes' Magazine.
Wear and Tear
The first thing that a Scotch baby is
taught is to learn to catch rubber balls
on the first bounce. It saves both
wear and tear on the ball and also the
floor or carpet.
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TELEPHONES MAIN 1208 AND 1209
good Client
MEMBERS of the Bar acting as attorneys
for estates in cases where a bank is execu-
tor or administrator find a financial institu-
tion to be a good client.
The bank's officers are experienced, under-
stand the business in hand, are always avail-
able and appreciate the importance of legal
service. Matters of accounting, colletions,
and other business details of which counsel
are glad to be relieved are attended to by
the bank. The combination of a good law-
yer and an experienced trust department
produces the best possible administration.
At each of the undersigned banks it is an
established policy that the attorney who
draws the will designating the bank in a
fiduciary capacity shall be chosen as attor-
ney for the estate.
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY
THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
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